We develop a theory for a transition economy under which an unbalanced development strategy that favors special economic zones emerges as a response to two critical problems: (1) political pressure to satisfy certain social expenditure requirements, and (2) the lack of institutions to constrain the state from expropriation. By promoting the concentration of resources in some areas, a low equilibrium trap can be avoided, while important spillover effects may be generated elsewhere. The experience of China with special economic zones and coastal open areas is interpreted in this light. Some problems in the Russian economy are also discussed in the context of this theory.
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Introduction
One of the longest-standing debates in the theory of economic development concerns the relative efficacy of balanced as opposed to leading sector investment strategies for achieving rapid growth. The balanced growth theory, associated first with the work of Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) , Nurkse (1953) , and Scitovsky (1954) , proposes that, due to important economic interrelationships and complementarities, all sectors of the economy should be developed simultaneously. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) formalized some of these ideas in a model in which, unless all sectors move up in concert, fixed investment in any one sector will be unprofitable due to lagging sectors. The most noteworthy opponent of the balancedgrowth school, Hirschman (1958) , also emphasizes interdependencies and complementarities between sectors. Although a developing country may not have sufficient resources to make large investments in all sectors simultaneously, investing in one or a few key leading sectors could have the effect of pulling up other interdependent sectors.
The recent experience of economic transition in the former planned economies has cast a new light on this classical debate, raising anew important questions about appropriate economic policies that affect the allocation of limited investment resources. However, the relatively successful experience of China has featured regionally unbalanced development that was concentrated first in the East and coastal regions and later extended to the West and inland. This development reflected early policy decisions to establish several special economic zones and coastal open areas. These regions gained considerable autonomy, enjoyed preferential tax treatment, and received relatively high levels of resources. However, such strategies remain controversial. Important potential drawbacks include a possibly inefficient diversion of resources, increased regional inequality, and the possibility that other lagging regions could obstruct the process of economic development.
Arguments offered in favor of the special-economic-zones development strategy of China include: (i) the absorption of foreign investment without involving the domestic economy (i.e., the dual track argument);
(ii) learning (i.e., the experimentation argument); and (iii) strategic economic relations with Hong Kong (i.e., the Hong Kong factor argument). This paper presents a new, although complementary, theory of unbalanced development in which special economic zones can be interpreted as possible catalysts for transition from a 2 planned to market economy. This theory, in fact, employs an interpretation of a special economic zone that is broader than the common use of the term. It applies potentially to any geographical area or sector that receives one of two particular types of special policy treatments in the areas of taxation and investment. In the case of China, for example, areas such as the Guangdong and Fujian provinces would be included.
Our theory concerns a central policy dilemma during economic transition that has been neglected in most discussions of this subject and is derived from: (1) political pressure to satisfy certain social expenditure requirements, and (2) the lack of institutions to constrain the state from expropriation. The political constraint implies the need for significant tax revenue during the transition period. Due to the absence of 1 developed institutions to constrain the state, if profits and tax revenue are low, the government can respond by increasing taxes ex post, and, thereby, depress incentives for restructuring. Consequently, some transition economies today, e.g., Russia, Ukraine, and Bulgaria, appear to be in a trap of continual budgetary pressures, high and unstable taxation, significant tax evasion, and low incentives for investment in the economy as a whole. 2 In our model, strategic complementarities (e.g., Cooper and John, 1988; Milgrom and Roberts, 1990) between firms, regions, or other economic organizations can arise as follows. If most units restructure and pay taxes, the government will procure enough revenue to satisfy its political constraint and not increase taxes ex post with high probability. On the other hand, if only a few units restructure and the rest do not, revenue will be so low that the government will succumb to pressure and increase tax rates with high probability. In this situation, multiple equilibria can exist, and the prospect of a bad equilibrium trap emerges. 3 This problem involves not only resources for direct state investment, which remains important during the transition period, but also policies that affect the allocation of private domestic and foreign investment.
By creating special economic zones that receive a high concentration of infrastructural investments that are complementary to local efforts in restructuring, the bad equilibrium trap described above can be potentially avoided. The advantage of investment relative to tax incentives in this context is its relatively irreversible nature involving commitment. At the same time, special tax treatment for economic zones can be an important supporting policy in these circumstances, even if commitment is imperfect. Therefore, an optimal transition strategy might coordinate investment with fiscal policies to strengthen economic incentives when commitment is difficult. A special economic zone is an example of such coordination.
In our model, a U-shaped relationship emerges between commitment power by the government and the effectiveness of special economic zones. A balanced investment strategy, i.e., the absence of special zones, will be optimal if the commitment power of the government is either very strong or very weak. In the former case, special economic zones are not needed to strengthen fiscal policy. In the latter case, investment resources are not sufficient to strengthen fiscal policy enough to eliminate the potential for coordination failure. Special economic zones can be optimal in the intermediate case, particularly if there is a high degree of complementarity between resources that are sensitive to state investment policies and local restructuring efforts, and if the attitudes of the population are pessimistic. In certain circumstances due to spill-over effects, it may even be possible to convert a bad equilibrium trap into a unique equilibrium with global restructuring. However, such an equilibrium will still remain second best, since the presence of special economic zones will distort the ex post allocation of investment.
We further identify two qualitatively different types of special economic zones, the relative expedience of which depends on particular circumstances. A type-1 strategy combines high investment with very low taxes in order to maximize the incentive effect in special areas of the economy. A type-2 strategy combines high investment with significant taxation in special areas to exploit spill-over effects into the rest of the economy. We derive results to identify under what conditions each will be optimal.
Our theory can be applied to the Chinese and Russian experiences. In China, in the 1980s, domestic and most foreign investment were concentrated in special economic zones and coastal areas that also received special tax treatment. Only in the 1990s, as the population became more optimistic about the reform, was a more balanced strategy of investment between coastal and inland areas adopted. Viewed in isolation, special economic zones induce inefficient resource diversion and regional disparity. As our theory indicates, however, this may be a necessary price to pay for escaping a bad equilibrium trap. As special economic zones can reduce the costs of institutional and political constraints, they may be viewed as catalysts for transition. Five years into economic transition in Russia, by contrast, sharp yearly declines in investment 4 activity continue in a highly unstable fiscal environment, that is characterized by continual changes in tax 4 rules and emergency tax collection drives to meet expenditure requirements. This situation corresponds 5 roughly to the above story of coordination failure.
Previous studies that address the question of unbalanced development stress both heterogeneity and technological interdependencies between sectors or regions. The same is true for some studies in regional and urban economics that highlight different physical endowments and agglomeration economies as factors that favor unbalanced development. For purposes of clarity, the model in this paper abstracts deliberately from these considerations. The integration of our approach with these classical literatures will be a project for future research.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 analyzes the case of balanced investment. Section 4 looks at the role of special economic zones, including type-1 and type-2 strategies. Section 5 examines the experience of China. Section 6 contains comments on Russia and Eastern Europe. Finally, the Appendix contains proofs of the propositions.
The Model
We model firms in the economy on a [0,1] continuum and assume that they are identical. A firm in our model represents a state or private unit with genuine restructuring or start-up potential. Other firms with no such potential are relevant only as they affect the political constraint considered below. The assumed absence of heterogeneity among firms or increasing returns to scale to investment serves to rule out reasons other for the optimality of special economic zones involving unbalanced investment.
The government distributes a fixed amount of investment, I, among these firms. If I is the i investment received by firm i, then the constraint of the government is I I di = I. The government also 0 i 1 6 chooses a planned tax scheme that links tax obligations to the output of an individual firm, i.e., t(y). For the present, we assume that the government sets tax rates as a function of revenue only and does not use the index of firms. As will be demonstrated, this assumption has no effect on the basic conclusions. Given the investment strategy and the tax rates announced by the government, each individual firm makes a binary choice between no restructuring and restructuring. No restructuring leads to a low level of net revenue y $ 0 and restructuring leads to a higher level of net revenue y ) > y. We adopt the notation t(y)=t, and t(y ))=", and assume 0 # t # y, and 0 # " # y ).
The key structural assumptions of the model, motivated by the experience of economic transition, concern pressure on the government to meet certain state expenditures. First, this pressure becomes larger when the level of social expenditures becomes low. Second, in the absence of well-developed fiscal institutions, this pressure may force the government to renege on its commitment to a tax scheme and to adjust tax rules or collection procedures to procure more revenue. These together imply that the government's commitment to a tax scheme is an increasing function of its social expenditure.
In the context of transition economies, these conditions actually admit multiple interpretations. The interpretation that we stress concerns the power of interest groups that receive explicit or implicit subsidies from the state. These groups may include management and employees of loss-making enterprises, pensioners, ministries, or other organizations that profit from special relations with government organs. A primary factor that distinguishes economies in transition from other developing countries is the inheritance from the past of a large number of organizations and individuals who depend on the state for resources. They are always engaged in lobbying for support, but their leverage over government policy is generally stronger when their subsidies are relatively low.
The exact source of this leverage differs from country to country. In China, the state is concerned, first and foremost, with the preservation of political stability and fears that too large a number of discontented workers and pensioners could lead to riots and instability. In Russia, the government has been locked into 7 ambitious stabilization programs, involving international organizations and investors, designed to reduce yearly budget deficits and inflation. In this context, social pressure, as well as demands for debt service, had to be addressed by regular campaigns to procure more tax revenue. The social pressure comes from multiple sources. First, when social expenditures become very low, which can be associated with growing wage and pension arrears and lay-offs, opposition parties can campaign successfully in national and regional elections.
Second, strikes and social unrest, perhaps involving the military, can mount. Third, regional administrations can exert direct pressures, for example, by threatening to withhold tax or other revenue from the federal government until basic federal expenditures to the region are met.
In our model, for simplicity, we assume that the government channels all initial tax revenue, i.e., T = 6 I t(y )di into the social safety net to satisfy the demand of the interest groups. The funds for initial 0 i 1 investment, I, are assumed to be in a separate account and cannot be transferred to the social safety net.
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After receiving the amount T, the interest groups apply pressure on the government to increase subsidies through increased taxation. Let D be the probability that the government succeeds in upholding its commitment. The above structural assumptions imply that D would be an increasing function of T, i.e., the probability that the government can uphold its commitment is increasing in the amount of revenue that it initially collects. For analytical convenience, we assume D to be a continuous function of T. In the event that the government is able to uphold its commitment, firms receive the difference between revenue y and planned taxes t(y). If not, we assume that all revenue y is confiscated by the government. This defines the expected 9 payoffs of the firms, the interest groups, and the government. If C(y ,I ) is the cost function for firm i, given i i the allocated investment I , the expected payoff to firm i is:
The interest groups receive all collected tax revenue. Thus, their expected payoff is
We assume that the government gives equal weight to the firms (i.e., producer surplus) and the interest groups (i.e., consumer surplus). The expected payoff to the government is the sum of the expected payoffs to the firms and to the interest groups:
By this formulation, the government has no other motive to generate tax revenue than to resist the pressure from the interest groups. In the extreme case when the government has full commitment power, i.e., D = 1, the government would optimize by setting taxes at zero. Thus, the problem analyzed in this paper is separate from other distributional issues that, given our assumption of complete information, would not pose additional problems.
Without loss of generality, we order firms by index i according to the amount of investment that they receive, i.e. the smaller the index, the higher the investment. We can therefore limit the government to the consideration of I schemes that are non-increasing in i. We denote C(y ), I ) as C(I ), which is decreasing and i i i convex in I . To simplify our analysis, we assume that C(y,I ) is independent from I and is normalized to 0.
It is also assumed that restructuring is always efficient in the sense that y ) -C(I ) $ y, oe I $ 0.
i i
The sequence of the game is as follows.
[place Figure 1 here]
In this game, any given choice of {I ,",t} by the government defines a continuation game in a i simultaneous choice by firms of whether or not to restructure. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium of this continuation game, which we will refer to as a continuation equilibrium, is a strategy profile {y =y ), for i < " i and y = y for i > "}, " 0[0,1], such that: Proposition 1 indicates that the government can always eliminate strategic complementarities and the potential for coordination failure, by offering a tax schedule that is decreasing in revenue. The reason for this follows directly from the nature of the objective function of a firm. Since D is an increasing function, the perceived benefits from restructuring for a single firm will be increasing or decreasing in the restructuring decisions of other firms, depending on whether t(y) is an increasing or decreasing function. Thus, an interesting feature of this game is that the government can choose whether or not to create strategic substitutes or complements among the firms.
We will refer to an equilibrium for a given allocation of investment, {I }, as a strategy profile {" ,t ; i * * y (",t)} such that, (a) {y (",t)} is a continuation equilibrium for any given (",t), and, (b), (" , t ) maximizes the i i * * government's payoff B , given {y (",t)}. Thus, an equilibrium involves both strategies by the firms that g i choose a continuation equilibrium for any specified tax scheme, and a tax scheme chosen to maximize the 8 government's payoff given these strategies.
Equilibrium Under the Balanced Investment Strategy
We first consider possible equilibria under the balanced investment strategy, i.e., I = I oe i, or in the i absence of special economic zones. Three distinct cases are possible depending on both the absolute commitment power of the government and the degree to which that commitment power is increasing in tax
revenue. An equilibrium is regarded as unique if it features identical revenue and expected payoffs for the government and the firms. Case 1 corresponds to strong government commitment power, even at low levels of revenue. Full commitment, or D(t)=1 oe t, is an extreme example. The government can always set t=y to guarantee a maximum amount of revenue and thus a minimum amount of social pressure if firms produce y. The condition of case 1 indicates that there exists a non-increasing tax schedule, {"=t , t=y}, such that, at an equal * allocation of investment, social pressure is low enough that every firm can be guaranteed a positive marginal 9 expected gain from restructuring. The declining tax schedule eliminates strategic complementarities and thus the potential for multiple equilibrium so that restructuring can be made a dominant strategy for every firm in the continuation game. Notice that this condition is quite restrictive, since the government is actually recovering less revenue at t in a restructuring equilibrium than it obtains in the case of no restructuring. * Case 2 corresponds to the situation where the probability that the government will uphold its fiscal commitment is low at low levels of revenue but high at high levels of revenue. That is, D is very responsive to social pressure and significantly increasing in tax revenue. In order for y =y ), oe i to be incentive-compatible, i the government must generate tax revenue above what is possible at low output, y. The fact that there exists a t $ y that satisfies the above inequality implies that such a good equilibrium in which all firms are * restructuring does indeed exist. However, such a tax scheme will induce restructuring only when the expectations of firms are "optimistic" concerning the behavior of other firms. Due to strategic complementarities from an increasing D, multiple continuation equilibria will always exist in case 2 under balanced investment.
The final case corresponds to the situation where D is small at all levels of revenue. As in case 1, equilibrium will always be unique. But y = y ) oe i will no longer be an equilibrium. In case 3, as in case 2, the i condition D(y)y ) # C(I), indicating particularly weak commitment ability at revenue y, is necessary and sufficient for the existence of an equilibrium in which no firm restructures.
Therefore, under the balanced investment strategy, either very significant or very insignificant absolute commitment power will lead to a unique equilibrium. If commitment power is significant at high levels of revenue and insignificant at low levels of revenue, there will exist multiple equilibria, the set of which always includes y = y ) oei. that a firm will receive from restructuring as opposed to not restructuring given that a fraction " of the firms restructure. Then
A given firm will have an incentive to restructure, given that a share " of the firms is restructuring, if and only
[place Figures 2, 3 , and 4 here]
The Role of Special Economic Zones
We now turn to the question of when the creation of special economic zones, in which the government allocates investment unequally among the firms, is superior or inferior to a balanced-investment strategy. The first simple result states that, as long as the government has significant commitment power even at low levels of revenue, balanced investment always dominates any unbalanced strategy. This is because, by Proposition 2, a balanced investment allocation will generate a unique equilibrium in which y = y ) i oe i. By the assumed strict convexity of C(I) in I, any other investment strategy would generate a strictly lower social payoff regardless of the induced continuation equilibrium.
Proposition 4: In case 1 of Proposition 2, a balanced investment strategy (I = I oe i) yields a strictly higher i social surplus, i.e., government payoff, than any unbalanced investment strategy.
For the case of potential multiple equilibria, we define notions of optimistic and pessimistic equilibrium selection: 11 Definition 1: An equilibrium under optimistic (respectively, pessimistic) selection for a given investment profile, {I }, corresponds to strategies by the firms, {y (t,")}, to select the continuation equilibrium that i i maximizes (respectively, minimizes) the social surplus, i.e., government payoff, for any given (t, ").
Optimistic and pessimistic equilibrium selection coincide only if all continuation equilibria generate an identical social surplus. This will of course be true when the continuation equilibrium is unique.
Proposition 5: In case 2 of Proposition 2:
(a) under optimistic equilibrium selection, balanced investment always leads to a strictly greater social surplus than unbalanced investment.
(b) under pessimistic selection, a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an unbalanced investment strategy that generates a higher government payoff than balanced investment is the existence of
Part (a) of Proposition 5 holds since, under optimistic selection, the government can induce an efficient equilibrium in which all firms are restructuring and investment is allocated, which parallels case 1.
Under pessimistic selection, however, unbalanced investment may be optimal. Condition (1) will hold if, either D is not too low in the event that firms do not restructure, or, if the effect of additional investment on the costs of restructuring is significant enough. This condition can be interpreted as the existence of an investment level Î, such that, if the government gives Î to a small subset of firms in special economic zones together with a commitment of a low tax, "=0, restructuring will become a dominant strategy for these firms.
These firms will restructure independently of the strategies of other firms. If such an Î exists, this strategy will dominate any strategy of balanced investment for the government in case 2 under pessimistic selection.
Proposition 6: In case 3 of Proposition 2, (1) is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an unbalanced investment strategy that generates a unique equilibrium and yields a strictly greater social surplus than the unique equilibrium under balanced investment.
In case 3, it turns out that the government can also use special economic zones to improve incentives and realize a better equilibrium if (1) is satisfied. However, the government is not using this strategy to combat coordination failure as in case 2. As will be seen, the scope for the effectiveness of this strategy is enhanced if D is a rapidly increasing function.
Our results demonstrate an interesting U-shaped relationship between commitment power by the government and the effectiveness of unbalanced investment strategies. An unbalanced investment strategy is not optimal when commitment power is very strong (case 1) and when it is very weak (case 3 without condition (1)). In the former case, fiscal policy alone is enough to provide global incentives to restructure. In the latter case, fiscal policy or investment opportunities are so weak, that even the two policy tools together are not sufficient to prevent a globally bad equilibrium.
To further our analysis, we distinguish between two qualitatively different types of unbalanced investment strategies, i.e., special economic zones. The first type involves a decreasing tax schedule, i.e., a low tax for restructuring firms. This combines preferential investment with low taxes to provide as strong an incentive for restructuring as possible for those firms in special economic zones. We refer to this strategy as a "type-1 strategy". The declining tax schedule, by Proposition 1, eliminates the strategic complementarities and generates a unique equilibrium. The role of unbalanced investment is to lower the marginal costs of restructuring for some fraction of the firms in order to induce them, and only them, to restructure. This may eliminate the bad equilibrium trap under balanced investment with pessimistic selection, as illustrated in Figure 5 . However, all firms restructuring, i.e., "=1, cannot be an equilibrium under a type-1 unbalanced investment strategy with pessimistic selection because total investment resources are too limited.
[place Figure 5 here]
A second type of unbalanced investment strategy involves an increasing tax schedule, which we will refer to as a "type-2 strategy." In this type of strategy, because h(") is increasing, we have strategic complementarities and positive spillovers. The government jump starts the economy by exploiting the 13 positive spillover effects. Firms with larger investments and lower marginal costs restructure and generate high enough revenue to reduce social pressure, which in turn increases the incentive for some other firms with lower investment to follow suit. In the language of game theory, this type-2 investment strategy works on the iterative elimination of dominated strategies. A small subset of firms in special economic zones is given very high investment to make restructuring a dominant strategy even at the high tax rate. The spillover effect from the implied additional tax revenue allows the government to make restructuring a best response for another subset of firms outside the special economic zones, even with a lower level of investment.
As illustrated in Figures 6 and 7 , because of high investment, restructuring is a dominant strategy for the first fraction f of the firms. However, given that this fraction of the firms restructure, the next (f -f )
fraction of the firms also are induced to restructure. Since tax revenues generated from the first f firms are 1 high enough to increase significantly the probability that the government will maintain its fiscal commitment, an additional incentive is provided for the next (f -f ) fraction of the firms. This process continues 2 1 inductively and leads to an equilibrium where some fraction " > 0 of the firms restructure. But since C(I) is strictly convex, even the equilibrium in which all firms restructure is still not first best because the allocation of investment will be ex-post suboptimal.
[place Figures 6 and 7 here] In what follows, we analyze the relative advantages of the optimal type-1 and type-2 unbalanced investment strategies without differentiating tax rates among firms. First, we note that, for both incentive and tax revenue purposes, it is always optimal for the government to set t = y. Given this condition, a type-2 strategy is feasible under a smaller set of parameter values than a type-1 strategy. To make restructuring a dominant strategy for a subset of the firms at some high tax rate ">t=y$0, condition (1) For the next result, we will assume for simplicity that y=0 and C=1/(1+I). This makes both type-1 and type-2 strategies feasible and allows us to concentrate on optimality. In addition, we will represent D(t) = a + bt, where a > 0, b > 0, and a + b # 1. This allows us to interpret "a" as a measure of the government's 14 "absolute commitment power" that does not depend on social pressure and, thus, revenue. On the other hand, "b" measures how responsive commitment power is to revenue. We will refer to this as "variable commitment power." Since y=0 in this case, t= 0. A type-1 strategy combines unbalanced investment with "=t=0 while a type-2 strategy employs unbalanced investment with ">0=t. In Proposition 7, (a) corresponds to the case of Proposition 2, case 1, and Proposition 5. Absolute commitment power is high enough and costs at balanced investment are low enough to support a unique efficient equilibrium with global restructuring. In the case of (b), absolute commitment power at low (zero) revenue is not great enough to support such a unique equilibrium but variable commitment power is also weak; hence, the spillover effect of a type-2 strategy will be weak. The interpretation of (c) is as follows.
First, variable commitment power is strong relative to absolute commitment power. This implies that the "a" associated with a type-1 strategy is likely to be very low due to a low probability of commitment at low revenue and that the spillover effect from a type-2 strategy is relatively large. However, this spillover effect cannot be exploited unless investment resources are large enough to create a revenue zone in which incentives for restructuring are strong despite both high taxes and low commitment probability. This consideration leads to a lower bound on investment resources, I(a). The upper bound, ¦(a) comes from the fact that, since costs asymptotically approach 0, very high I will create case (a) for any fixed "a."
To summarize, when both are feasible, a type-1 strategy tends to dominate a type-2 strategy if commitment power at low revenue is very weak and not increasing significantly in revenue or initial investment resources are very modest. On the other hand, a type-2 strategy can work better than a type-1 strategy in situations where government resources for investment or the ability to attract foreign investment are relatively significant and social pressure decreases relatively quickly in tax revenue.
The Chinese Experience
The successful Chinese experience with special economic zones and coastal open areas can be interpreted using our analysis. In July 1979, the Chinese government decided that the two southern provinces, Guangdong and Fujian, should pursue reform one step ahead of other regions. In 1980, China formally established four special economic zones, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou in Guangdong, and Xiamen in Fujian. These zones and the areas of Guangdong and Fujian gained considerable autonomy, for example, in approving foreign investment projects from the central government and enjoyed preferential treatment (Zhou, 1984) .
During the entire decade of the 1980s, domestic and foreign investment in these areas were very high.
In the early 1980s, when foreign investment first came to China, it was concentrated in these areas and this trend continued to the late 1980s. For example, between 1985 and 1991, foreign investment in Guangdong province accounted for more than 20% of the national total (Statistical Yearbook of Guangdong, 1992, p. 355, and previous issues) . In contrast, between 1979 and 1991, total In China, at the early stage of the reform, the government's commitment power was very weak, domestic and foreign investment abilities were limited, and the population was pessimistic. Our theory shows that it may be optimal to concentrate investment and fiscal incentives in the special economic zones. China apparently followed this type-1 strategy. The result is that Guangdong restructured due to concentrated investment and low taxes while the government relied on the less-reformed region of Shanghai for revenue to meet political obligations and maintain social expenditures. From this perspective, regions like Shanghai might need to be taxed heavily during the early stages of reform because the revenue was needed to resist political pressure in other parts of the country.
The situation changed somewhat in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The government continues to concentrate investment in special economic zones but relies on larger flows of revenues from those regions.
The central government started to raise less revenue from Shanghai and more tax revenue from regions like Guangdong. Tax revenue remitted from Shanghai to the central government declined from 12 billion in 1986 to about 9.5 billion per year between 1988 and 1991 (Statistical Yearbook of Shanghai, 1992 . At the same time, tax revenue remitted by Guangdong province to the central government reportedly increased more than two times between 1988 and 1991 (Qian and Stiglitz, 1996) . Thus, in the early 1990s, China appears 11 to have move from a type-1 to a type-2 oriented strategy. Higher tax revenue from heavily invested regions generates a positive spill-over effect and pulls up the rest of the economy, from Guangdong initially to other coastal areas, and then to the whole country.
In the mid-1990s, the situation changed further. Since 1993, the expectations of the population became more optimistic about the future of reform and development and the government apparently shifted to a more balanced investment strategy. For example, the 1994 tax reform basically unified tax rates across regions and the new policies phased out the preferential treatment enjoyed by the special economic zones.
Also, inland areas started to receive more attention and more investment, both domestic and foreign. Overall, the strategy concerning coastal and inland regions became more balanced.
Concluding Remarks: Investment Problems in Russia
The political constraints and commitment problems explored in this paper are also relevant to some countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. After five years of economic transition in Russia, some progress has been made in macroeconomic stabilization. However, the economic environment still exhibits high, unstable taxation, corresponding to continual adjustments of tax rules and enforcement and chronic tax revenue crises. Firms operating in Russia face an average of about 50 different but important taxes; their combined burden is such that tax evasion is considered a necessity for operating a profitable business (Makarevich, 1996) . In virtually every year, series of decrees is aimed at tapping new sources of tax revenue, including the application of new taxes retroactively. Despite these special measures, tax revenue as a share of GDP has continued to decline along with substantial declines in investment activity (OECD, 1997).
In 1996, associated with the presidential and gubernatorial elections, strong political pressure involving numerous social policy and other expenditure commitments led to an extraordinarily tough emergency tax collection drive at mid-year. During this drive, firms with tax arrears were required to channel all transactions through a single bank account and banks were required to automatically send on payments to state budgets (OECD, 1997) . The investment environment in Russia is characterized by generally weak incentives (Litwack, 1997 , Hendley et al, 1997 , OECD, 1997 . In addition to high, unstable taxation and high interest rates due to budgetary problems, investment in Russia is also limited by a weak infrastructure.
The slow speed of agricultural reform, for example, is linked to the poor state of roads and cold storage facilities, which decrease the expected returns on individual investments. Thus, the problems examined in this paper, namely, limited resources of the state, political pressures on the budget that grow with decreases in state expenditures, the absence of fiscal commitment, and important complementarities between infrastructural and local investments, all exist in Russia.
The question of special economic zones has received much attention and debate in Russia in recent years leading to a draft law on free economic zones in 1995. However, this draft law remained dormant for a long time. Only in 1997 has a new draft law on free economic zones been passed by the parliament. At the same time, a few selected regions, e.g., Kaliningrad, Nakhodka, Ingushetiia, have received at least temporary, although yet uncertain, status as special zones, with preferential tax rates and advantages for foreign investments. Although the expedience of creating types of special economic zones in Russia or in other
European transition economies involves important issues different from those considered in this paper, we believe that a consideration of the specific factors listed in the previous paragraph should be central to any policy evaluation in this area.
1 0 existence of an ",(0,1) such that h(")=C(I ), thus {y =y ) for i<" and y =y for i>"} is a continuation
Define g (")=h(")-C(I ). If "<t, g is monotonically decreasing in ", which means that (i), (ii), and (iii)
are mutually exclusive and " is unique in (ii). If ">t, g is increasing in " and multiple continuation i equilibrium are possible (as in Figure 3 ). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Let I =I. Then g(")=h(")-C(I)#D(""+(1-")t)[y )-"]-C(I).
i Case 1: The choice of {"=t ,t=y} gives g(1)>0, hence "=1 is a unique continuation equilibrium. Since it * maximizes the government's payoff, the tax policy is also optimal.
Case 2: Given a tax policy {"=t ,t=y}, g(1)$1, thus "=1 is a continuation equilibrium. However, for this tax * policy, g(0)#D(y)[y )-y]-C(I)<0; therefore "=0 is also a continuation equilibrium. By the same argument, "=0 is a continuation equilibrium for any tax policy that satisfies "$y. If "<y, g(1)= D(")[y )-"]-C(I)<0; hence "=1 is not a continuation equilibrium but some "<1 is. Hence, there exist strategies for the firms that select a continuation equilibrium in case 2 such that "<1 for all (",t) . Equilibrium in the case of these strategies must imply "<1.
By setting tax policy {"=0,t=y}, g(0)=D(y)y )-C(I). If D(y)y )>C(I), "=0 cannot be a continuation equilibrium but the government can guarantee a continuation equilibrium with ">0. Therefore, "=0 cannot be an equilibrium. Conversely, if D(y)y )#C(I), D being an increasing function implies that g(0)#0 oe (t,");
hence "=0 will always be a continuation equilibrium for any (t,"). Therefore, there will exist an equilibrium with "=0.
Case 3: First, suppose "$t. Then g(") is non-decreasing. By the condition of case 3, g(1)<0. Therefore, 22 g(")<0 for all ". This implies that y =y, for all i is the only continuation equilibrium. If "<t, g(") is i decreasing. There will be a unique continuation equilibrium by Proposition 1. However, by the condition of case 3, g(1)<0. Hence, it must be the case that any continuation equilibrium in case 3 implies an "<1, and that equilibrium will be unique. The government will induce the maximum " across continuation equilibria.
The final part follows an identical argument to that in the last paragraph of the proof of Case 2 above.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: (i) Case 1 obviously remains the same since the non-indexed tax schemes that induce the unique continuation equilibrium with "=1 remain feasible in this case.
(ii) In case 2, there still must exist an equilibrium with "=1 since the same strategies and same non-indexed government tax policy will work in this case. Now consider the class of strategies for the firms such that y = i y for any tax scheme that features " >y. As long as all other firms choose strategies from this class, no firm i would want to deviate and choose a strategy from outside of this class. Such a unilateral deviation to y ) for a firm that receives " >y would give:
where S = {j: y =y )} and S'= {j: y =y}. The first inequality follows from the facts that t #y oei and, by the j j i definition of this class of strategies, y =y ) implies that " #y. The second inequality follows directly from the j j condition of case 2 and the assumption that " >y. Then a straightforward application of the technique used to i prove Proposition 1 demonstrates the existence of strategies in this class that choose a continuation equilibrium for any tax scheme.
However, a continuation equilibrium in the case of these strategies can never imply "=1, since this would give the condition that y =y ) and " #y oe i. This would imply, for a firm in the group that receives the
Therefore,
But since " #y, the last expression contradicts the condition of case 2. Therefore, this selection of equilibrium i 23 strategies for the firms gives "<1 for any tax scheme. Therefore, there exists an equilibrium with these strategies in case 2 such that "<1. The remainder of the proof of Proposition 3 follows the proof of Proposition 2 quite closely. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: (a) By Case 2 of Proposition 2, under balanced investment, there exists an equilibrium under which all firms restructure ("=1), i.e., the equilibrium under optimistic selection. Thus, balanced investment would be optimal under optimistic selection.
(b) Suppose that the condition (1) does not hold. Then D(y)y )#C( Î), oe Î, which means that "=0 is an equilibrium under any allocation of investment. Thus, given pessimistic selection, an unbalanced investment strategy cannot increase the social surplus in equilibrium.
Suppose that (1) Then, by (1) , "=0 can no longer be a continuation equilibrium, since an individual firm that receives Î would have an incentive to deviate to y ). By Proposition 1, there will be a unique continuation equilibrium that implies an ">0. This gives a strictly greater payoff to the government than under "=0 and balanced investment.
Consider next the case where D(y)y )#C(I) and ">0 in equilibrium under balanced investment and pessimistic selection. Then it must be the case that "<t in equilibrium under balanced investment and the continuation equilibrium is unique. This is because "$t would imply g(0)#D(t)[y )-t]-C(I)<0; hence "=0 is a continuation equilibrium and would be chosen under pessimistic selection. Now choose the following unbalanced investment strategy: Set I =I+, for i , [0,"] and I = I -",/(1-") for i , [",1] . Then if the i i government chooses the same tax scheme as in the case of balanced investment, by Proposition 1, the continuation equilibrium will still be unique. Furthermore, by the choice of I , the incentive-compatibility i constraints for the same " will still be satisfied. Thus, this unique continuation equilibrium must imply the same ". Because C(I) is decreasing, this equilibrium will yield a strictly greater social surplus. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: Repeat the arguments in the proof of Proposition 4, replacing "equilibrium under pessimistic selection" with "unique equilibrium." Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7: (a) Apply Proposition 4.
(b) By Propositions 5 and 6, an unbalanced investment strategy is optimal in this case. Consider a type-1 strategy "=t=0, I = (1/a)-1 for i<" and I = 0 for i>", where "=(a/ (1-a) )I<1. This strategy is optimal among i i all type-1 strategies and yields the total social surplus equal to aI. On the other hand, because b#a, for any type-2 strategy featuring ">t=0, dh(")/d" = -a-b""+b" < 0. Incentives for restructuring are always weakened for all firms as compared with a type-1 strategy featuring "=0 and the same investment strategy. Hence, a type-2 strategy is never optimal and the optimal type-1 strategy is the optimal strategy.
(c) Assume a<b and ">0. Choose I such that C(I ) = h("), which implies that I = [1/(a+b"")(1-")] -1.
Under this investment strategy, firm " has just enough incentives to restructure provided that all firms with i<" restructure. Total investment required for supporting the restructuring of " firms in this way is I ( 1/(a+b"")(1-"))d" -" = (1/(1-")b") ln(1+b""/a) -".
"
Provided that the above quantity is no more than I, the total social surplus is given by I ( 1-(a+b"")(1-"))d" = (1-a(1-"))" -(1-")b"" /2. as a becomes small. Hence, the investment strategy is feasible. Total social surplus under this strategy is given by 1 -(a+b/4)/2 > 1/2. Thus, type-2 dominates type-1. Here "=1 under a type-2 strategy, which proves the final assertion in (c). Q.E.D.
reforms. After the Tiananmen Square incident, for example, the Chinese government introduced so-called "stability loans" to workers to prevent social unrest.
8. If the government could commit part or all of the investment funds to the safety net in order to increase the probability of upholding its commitment, our main results continue to hold with small modifications.
9. In addition to changes in tax rules and rates, the emergency drives for tax revenue in Russia have focused on the collection of outstanding tax arrears. Our model allows for this interpretation as well. In Russia, the explicit tax burden, corresponding to numerous federal, regional, and local taxes (including pressure for various "voluntary contributions") is so high that at least some degree of tax avoidance is believed by many to be a necessity for operating a business. In this case, t(y) can admit the interpretation of the amount of taxes actually paid under normal circumstances, whereas an emergency tax collection drive, reflecting budgetary pressures, would round up part of the remaining explicit taxes.
10. We have performed the entire analysis under the assumption that C(y, I ) is also decreasing and convex in i I , and obtained slightly modified, but more complicated, conditions for the optimality of balanced or i unbalanced investment strategies. As long as we maintain the condition that restructuring and investment are complements, it will be optimal to reallocate investment to restructuring firms at the margin as a deviation from balanced investment. If the reallocation of investment to make (1) in Proposition 5 hold is very large, however, then second-order cost effects could potentially change the relative optimality of various investment policies. The corresponding necessary and sufficient conditions are included in an earlier version of this paper and are available from the authors on request.
11. Although these figures may be exaggerated by Guangdong government officials, the trend is clear. 
